If you have checked out our recent blog post, I haven’t received my EAD; OPT EAD processing time, you might be familiar with the Ombudsman Office. The Ombudsman Office is an independent office which provides individual case assistance and makes recommendations to USCIS to improve their administration of immigration benefits. To serve its mission, the Ombudsman issues the yearly reports and this year’s report was published recently in June 30th, 2020. Amongst multiple articles in Annual Report 2020, Foreign Students and the Risks Surrounding Optional Practical Training caught my attention as it illustrates trends of OPT along with its potential risks and threats to the security and prosperity of the United States. I have written several blog posts regarding Trump Administration’s recommendations to limit certain employment programs for nonimmigrant visa holders which made international students and scholars worried and frustrated. So why OPT (Optional Practical Training) is considered threats to some people? This 24 pages long article explores how unguided OPT can be detrimental to the US by illustrating anecdotal evidences and looking at the numbers. This risk analysis and the proposed increase of OPT application fee is summarized especially to deepen the understanding of international students and scholars. Students who would like to see all the details can click here for the full article: Annual Report 2020.
Related blog posts: Trump H1B Visa suspension 6/24~12/31 2020
Contents
The rapid growth of OPT program
As you can see below, the number of OPT and STEM OPT applicants increased rapidly throughout the decades. There were only 2 STEM OPT participants in 2007 and the number grew into 69,650 after ten years. Given the fact that the number of enrolled international students in the U.S. decreased for three consecutive years, the emergence of OPT is noteworthy. Additionally, when you have a closer look into these numbers, more than 33% of OPT participants are from China only, followed by India 18% and South Korea 4.8%. General concerns stem in part from this rapid growth of OPT. According to the Ombudsman, “Federal officials in the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and Homeland Security, along with a variety of Congressional committees and subcommittees, have expressed concern at the emergence of OPT as a means for foreign countries to conduct data collection of sensitive technologies through students and researchers.” Here they use the term “non-traditional collectors (NTCs),” who don’t necessarily gather intellectual property and technologies in a traditional way but may serve as espionages for foreign nationals with their access to U.S. research and technology. This report is particularly focusing on the activities of Chinese governments like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Moreover, additional concerns come from the number of F-1 students who overstay in the United States. For instance, “in Fiscal Year 2018, 3.73 percent stayed beyond the authorized window for departure at the end of their program. The countries with the largest numbers of overstayers was China, with 12,924 students, India, with 5,716, and Saudi Arabia, with 3,917.”
Threats surrounding the OPT program
To investigate the risks and threats around the OPT program, the Ombudsman used the risk framework. To put it simply, the Ombudsman insists that there are in and out risk factors associated with OPT program. On the one hand, there are “in” risk factors which can be categorized as risk factors that are caused within the United States, on the other hand, “out” risk factors can be defined as foreign national’s (again, the report focuses on the Chinese government) intention to take advantage of the program by having non traditional collector (NTC)s. In and out factors that the Ombudsman office has observed are summarized below:
In risk factors
- Lean staffing at USCIS and SEVP
- Lack of training for DSO (Designated School Officials, commonly international student advisor) especially “about their role to prevent and report fraud.”
- Lack of vetting and verification of DSOs
- No existing mechanism for continuous vetting of foreign national students which makes the OPT vulnerable to existing and prospective threats
OPT has not been designed, staffed or administered to systemically counter such threats, is vulnerable to exploitation by foreign governments with interests adverse to those of the United States.
When a student seeks to apply for OPT program, she/he needs to complete the form I-765 which is an application for Employment Authorization Document. This application is adjudicated by USCIS which is a fee-funded agency. To juggle many responsibilities that USCIS staffs have, USCIS has determined to spend around 12 minutes per adjudication of this benefit. Moreover, It is also reported that the application fee that USCIS charge OPT applicants is not the right size compare to the costs of its operations and USCIS is currently seeking a OPT application fee increase. If the proposal by USCIS is approved, OPT applicants in the future will be charged $165 more.
The proposed increase for the EAD is 20 percent, or an additional $80, for a total of $575, which includes $85 to capture biometrics.
Out risk factors
Move on to the out risk factors, U.S. government is concerned about the risk posed by Chinese three big projects which Chinese government explicitly expressed their intentions to “to achieve economic, technical and military dominance by acquiring intellectual property and cutting-edge innovations.”
- Thousand talents plan (TTP): The TTP, which was initiated by Chinese government in 2008, “encourages participants to transfer research and other proprietary information from the United States to China.”
- Made in China 2025: Few years later from the TTP plan, Chinese government published another plan in 2015 titled ‘Made in China 2025’ which propose the transformation of “China into a leading manufacturing power by the year 2049.”
- Military-Civil Fusion and Dual-Use technologies: Amongst 10 sectors that are included in the Made in China 2025 plan (visualization of 10 sectors are attached below), most of military-civil fusion technologies are majors that are listed in the 24 month STEM extension list. On this topic, President Trump already announced the proclamation on limiting Chinese graduate students who intend to study “military-civil fusion technology.”
Related blog posts: Chinese students and researchers visa ban by Trump
Liu Ruopeng, a Duke Ph.D. student, who allegedly appropriated sensitive research funded by the U.S. military on metamaterials, and then returned to China to fund a highly successful research institute … which supports the Chinese military in advanced technological developments. …There is speculation that Ruopeng, “who came to the U.S. with the express intent of studying” metamaterials in the Duke lab, “was actually on a mission from the Chinese government.”
Foreign Students and the Risks Surrounding Optional Practical Training
Suggestions to mitigate risks
To prevent potential in and out risks and threats regarding the OPT, the Ombudsman suggested the following:
- Certification and recertification of DSOs
- SEVIS system supports for DSOs
- Requires an employer be identified in advance; or
- Cancel EADs of students who fail to report in to an employer within a reasonable time after EAD issuance with a legitimate employer
- Expand the mandatory use of E-verify to encompass all OPT employers
- Requires the existence of the training program
When you look at number 4 to 6, basically the Ombudsman made recommendations to apply STEM OPT requirements to non STEM OPT (initial OPT) to prevent work authorization program being misused. If number 4 takes place, it is highly likely that students would have 90 days or less to find e-verified (legitimate) company since F-1 students cannot accrue more than 90 days of unemployment days during their first year of OPT under the current regulations. In summary, EAD issuance fee (OPT application fee) is anticipated to increase and more strict initial OPT rules can be implemented to prevent overstays of F-1 students as well as data collection of sensitive technologies by International students and researchers.
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